The Equity and Efficiency of Charitable Giving
The Equity and Efficiency of Charitable Giving
Heidi Jane M. Smith
The equity
and efficiency of charitable giving are valid questions when looking policy
related to tax credits in the income tax.
Yet what holds deeper concern is
whether government provisions of public welfare are more efficient and
equitable than independent agents providing that care? Although lots of tools
in the policy analysis toolbox are utilized for this argument, non- experiments
of various sectors comparing impacts of governments work to independent
charities would be most appropriate it is not outside the constraints of this
paper. Yet what can be looked at are the
economic theories for welfare policy, analyzing public goods and it’s under
provision, if let to the market. Also looking the reasons for gift giving is
important. These incentives underline
why taxes deductions exist and how they can be used to be the most equitable
and efficient instruments for the means of this paper is tax policy.
Current policy questions on tax
policy for charitable giving are deductions to the estate and gift tax and for
non-itemize tax. Where as the estate tax
is one of the most progressive taxes, it questions vertical and horizontal equity
issues. Charitable deductions may
dictate policy. Should the higher income families decide where their money
should go? Would it be more efficient
for them to moderate it in a private foundation than the government regulates
it? Would they donate the money to
charity if there were no incentive under the system to donate the money and
avoid the tax? Is the money spent in
private foundations and nonprofits more efficient than government provisions? Horizontal equity issues question if you
don’t know the loopholes of the tax deduction for charity than you would pay
more money to charity in the long run by spending it in government
services. Vertical equity also needs to
look at the poor. Is it fair to allow
the higher income earners dictate policy, or decided how public provisions of
charity should be given or should it be up to the public (under government
welfare state) and public choice theory to decide?
Non-itemizers are generally not
higher income people who may donate small sums of money to charity, yet these
sums are so small regulating it creates administrative burdens. Although allowing these people to receive a
tax credit makes the system more equitable, it also makes administrative
difficulties. Therefore one needs to
question if this is an efficient way to generate revenue for charity. Money people are able to benefit from the
deduction stimulating vertical equity but it cuts into efficiency of the
tax. These among other questions will be
challenged in this paper. More
specifically the rest of the paper will concentrate on the equity, efficiency,
administrative burden and political feasibility of these two tax instruments.
Increases in Philanthropic efforts
Giving and philanthropy is on the
raise. Cited in Giving USA, in 1998
Americans contributed $174.5 billion to non-profits organizations. This is a
10.7% increase over 1997 figures. [1]
The Independent Sector, a Washington-Based association for non-profit
organizations, cited there were 1.1million nonprofits in 1996 and over 10.2 people
employed.[2] Elizabeth Boris, director of the Urban
Center’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, is quoted by suggesting that
these numbers are optimist and excessive, charitable has remained constant at
1.8 to 2% of income by individuals donating. [3]
In 1999, Microsoft chief Bill Gates and his wife, Melinda donate $16 billion to
the Gates Foundation marking the largest charitable gift in American History. [4]
This is more realistic, economic
booms of the economy have given more leads to charitable donations in the late
1990 and have seen down turns with the start of the economic rescission of the
early 21st century. Much of
this hype is due to the inflated stock prices. Often offered by employers as an
added benefit from their company, the capital gains made by investors is paid
out in charitable donations in order to avoid higher taxes. The dot.com bust of the stock market has
affect many nonprofit budgets for the worse.
Non-for-profits developed two
approaches for receiving increased donations.
One is a more hands-on approach to philanthropy including social
entrepreneurship as a key. This is using
business practices to improve the social sector, radical splitting from
previous grassroots styles of the third sector.
Yet nonprofits as businesses might backfire they should be mission
driven, not bottom-line driven and full of the sprit of volunteerism. Internet and on-line advocacy have become
another method used by the nonprofit world to gain wider support. Mechanisms of on-line donations have increase
small donations and one-time supporters.
Internet has also allowed the independent sector to become more visible
to the general public, which increase possible donations as well.
Within the U.S. 70.1% of American
households reported to have giving to charity and an annual $1,075 average
annual household contribution were reported in 1998.[5]
There are a total of 1.2 million independent sector organizations including
charity organizations, nonprofits and religious congregations (tax codes of
501(c) (3) and 501(c) (4)) that generated over $664.8 billion in revenue for
1997.[6] Resources came from private contributions
19.9%; government 31.3%; dues, fees and charges 37.5%; and other revenue
sources 11.4%. The sector has employed
10.6 million people including 7.1%of total U.S. employment in 1997. The numbers of organizations have grown from
739,000 in 1977 to over 1.19 million in 1997.
Charitable contributions in 1998 are broken down to religious
organizations 60.1%; youth development 4.9%; arts, culture and humanities 3.3%;
education 6.4%; environment 3.2%, health 6.5%, human services 9.0%; and other
6.4% includes international/foreign, private/community foundations,
public/societal benefits, recreations-adults and other types of charity.[7] Notable on average colleges graduate give
more than people above the age of 55. People who attend religious services
weekly or nearly every week give more then those who only reported to
attending.[8]
This indicates that there are large amounts of people who are welling to give
to aid the less fortunate.
Economic research has found that
man and women give to philanthropy equally but donate differently. Male donors
contribute 26.7% of their net wroth to charitable causes due to the estate tax
while 27.6% of women do.[9] “Experimental evidence that men and women
treat differently to variations in the cost of transferring income to others.” [10] Women spend more on education than men. Married couples where the women makes more
than the man changes the dynamics in the decision making and so does their
propensity to donate to specific sectors.
There is three majors sectors in
the economy that fund charity: businesses, households and government. Corporate philanthropy is especially subject
to the question of rationality. They may
not donate out of altruism but for long run business effects like less
transition costs or keeping society quite.
Rather their pursuit for profit maximization of monetary profits is much
greater than the benefits they receive from the warm feelings the have for
giving to the poor. The donations of
corporations can represent both an ordinary business expenditure and through
the firm consumption.”[11] Therefore business taxation is not used in
this paper to describe charitable deductions because it is difficult to
determine is bottom line purpose as being a true public good.
Economic arguments for Charity giving
Welfare debate=Charity?
Debates of charity come from the
social responsibility of individuals to help others who are less
fortunate. Yet as a general public, we
often leave the job to the church or our neighbors, shedding the burden to
others. Whose responsibility is it to help the poor anyhow?
The foundations of welfare were
the government’s responses to the charity, aiding the poor and hungry. The initial idea of welfare policy in the
U.S. was set to aid families hardest hit in the depression in 1935. “Welfare
has changed, as we knew it” as Clinton proclaimed in his political campaign is
one way the government has developed was to help the poor. The program
Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) in 1996. The use of aid to the poor is to alleviate three major
market failures: charity as a public good being under produced with
externalities, inequality making discrimination as a problem with barriers to
entry and income distribution as a public good.
Charity is argued to be a public
good with positive externalities. We want to help the poor so does our
neighbor, you expect the neighbor to pay and he expects you to pay causing an
under production of the resources for the poor. Net result is an under supply
of the good (making positive externalities).
Both with benefit and cost- total demand is less than the social demand
curve and government response to a positive externality is to subsidize through
charitable donations or tax exemptions. The reasons for charity is either
altruistic, to help others-do unto others as they would do for you, or selfish,
giving to charity to keep the poor quiet is good for social stability and
therefore good for business. Positive
externality also focus on the only important that thing to you is what the
neighbor does. If they make more and you
don’t you fell worse off and this is not Pareto efficient. Therefore the consequence is to over spend
and save too live cause less economic growth and spillovers to the poor.
Inequalities cause market
failures due to barriers to entry through discrimination. This exists in government as well as in
economics. It is wrong and inefficient
too! Prices are too high and quantity is
too low. Examples include discrimination
towards women, minorities, etc. in the work place. Discrimination causes income inequality due
to not allowing eligible people work also creating ridged working scales. Also causes problems with human capital
effecting the endowments of education to everyone. This ultimately creates
poorer people in the need for help.
Income distribution is a public good, too much
inequality cause lower economic growth.
This suggests that economic growth is jointly consumed and is not
excludible. This is a problem of public
goods with positive externalities producing an under supply of economic
growth. In the United States the “level
of income…is high enough so that more equal distribution on income should
mitigate the poverty problem and reduce its significance.”[12]
The higher the GDP, and growth of a country the more likely they will be
able to create more economic equality. Therefore helping the poor is important.
Charity as a Public Good
A problem with public goods (joint consumption/
non-excludable production) is that the demand is too low- resulting in free
riders (people who use the good and do not pay for it). The use of common means that there is a
natural adjustment to make the marginal social costs met the marginal private
demand. The solution is usually
government provision of the good however the optimal level of a public good is
subject to debate. Examples of
inequalities as under consumption of demand show too little government
involvement. Inequality causes problems with extremes become the higher incomes
are not so generous and the lesser incomes to steel to get by producing
social/civil unrest. An example is in the Brazilian economy 40% low –20% middle
-40% high income for its distribution.
Also there are examples of over government involvement, like
redistribution like Northern Europe.
People pay too much in taxes, which go to those who do not work. This is over compensating and making a
disincentive to not work. Not correcting
the disequilibria of paying too many or too few taxes.
Therefore governments have become
the major actor to mitigate problems of poverty. Yet do governments produce the most efficient
method of poverty alleviation? Optimal
levels are questionable. Some people
create nonprofit organization or start their own foundations, other donate
funds while some work in the public bureaucracy as public servants to work in
poverty mitigation. Charity has formed
some answers. Tax credits enable increase giving, voluntarism, cost-efficiency
and savings while reducing crowding out.
Yet tax credits are not the
solution to all. Liberals argue that
there is no way that private charities, even with increase donations could
replicate the current role of the federal government. Conservatives argue against foundation
suggesting it would undermine in the GOP’s effort to promote the flat tax. Also the idea of less government conservatives
would promote tax exemption, where nonprofits produce results that often times
government bureaucracies are inefficient. With tax credits, federal government
is not the automatic subsidize the poor yet enhance competition to poverty
reduction strategies.
Impure Altruism
Do people give to public goods
like charity for the warm-glow of giving or do they have another modus
operandi? Are their other factors
influencing their decision to give than pure altruism? One study done by James Andreoni studied
just that. He found that altruism model lack predictive power to demonstrate
theoretically and that government grants would crowed out voluntary gifts dolor
for dollar.[13] Studies have shown that local gift giving is
more likely than giving to large economies.
The generalization of the standard public goods model includes ‘impurely
altruistic’ motives to gift giving. Yet
‘pure altruism’ is extremely special, and predictions are not easily
generalized. Therefore a mix of output of not only government giving and not
only private donations is needed to help the poor. Andrdreoni suggests, “People may not gain
utility form increasing its total supply from the act of giving. Also when total provision of a public good is
independent of the distribution of income, the contributes government provision
completely crowds out private provision and subsidies are neutral.”[14] He concludes that best empirical model of
charity giving account for a mix of warm-glow giving (charity-giving) and
interdependence of preferences (government allocation of public goods).
Therefore if this is true than
one needs to evaluate the government mechanisms of poverty reduction. Although lots of tools in the policy analysis
toolbox are utilized for this argument, the particular instruments for the
means of this paper is tax policy. Taxes
are means in which government generates revenue for its programs, but if you
are not satisfied with the amount of programs that the government provides that
is outside the limits of this paper.
Current policy questions on tax policy for charitable giving are the
Estate and Gift tax and the charitable contributions Deduction for
Non-Itemizers. The rest of the paper will discuss the equity, efficiency,
administrative burden and political feasibility of each of these taxes.
Current
policy questions for taxes
Charitable giving and the Estate Tax
In 2000 Governor George W. Bush,
the Republican presidential candidate promised to “expand the charitable
deduction, allowing taxpayers who do not itemize their returns to deduct
contributions” and to end the “death tax” in his tax cut plan. Estate and gift tax reform has received
recent legislative appeal. The 105th
congress suggested increasing its base to $1 million and would be phased out by
2006. In the 106th Congress,
The Death Tax Elimination act of 2000 would gradually eliminate the tax by 2010
but was vetoed by President Clinton. Yet with George Bush’s support the Estate
and Gift tax is important to review because its affects to charity.[15]
The Estate and gift tax has
problematic appeals to both liberals and conservatives.[16] Liberals suggest that the reform of the
Estate tax will only aid the wealthy.
Suggesting the appeal will remove the most progressive element of the
tax system. It will cost the Treasury $50 billion within decades (estate taxes
comprise of about 1.4% of all federal revenue and its mean diminished financial
support for churches, synagogues, universities and other tax-exempt
institutions. Republicans argue that the
claim that the estate tax will aid farmers and small business the back bone of
America, calling these levies the death tax that effect everyone.
Under current legislation, people
must file a federal estate tax return within nine mouths of a family members
death if the gross estate is over $675,000.
Plus the tax include any gifs to decedent’s gross assets and any gifts
made exceed $10,000 per year per person receiving a donation. The tax rate begins at 37 percent and rises
to 55 percent for transfers above $3 million dollars.
Popular cases against the Estate
tax vary. Gale and Slemrod suggest the following excuses in a policy paper done
for a Brookings Institute conference on the subject: Taxing at death is
immoral; the estate tax stifles saving, labor supply and economic growth; the
estate tax hurts family owned business and farms; the estate tax discriminates
unfairly against savers; the estate tax is easily to avoids and creates huge
compliance cost; the estate tax doesn’t raise much revenue.[17] Also cases in favor they suggest the
following: the tax is progressive; transfer taxes serve as a backstop to the
income tax, transfer taxes reduce the concentration of wealth, transfer taxes
help the nonprofit sector. Although a
full discussion of the estate tax is unnecessary for this paper, a few details
are important to discuss due to the close relationship to charitable giving.
Data suggests that 1.9% estates
have taxable income. In 1997, 2,400
estates paid nearly one half average break of $3.4million. With a current $1.35milion credit a couple
(slated to raise to $2 million) the majority of middle- and upper- middle-
income Americans pay no estate taxes.
Family farms and small business account for few than 5% of all taxable
estate tax, one in 25 family pay any estate tax at all. Joel Slemrod, tax specialist at the
University of Michigan, stated, “Some business and families are the tails that
wag the dog,” suggesting this is such a small percentage of who actually pay
the tax.
So whom is the estate tax
affecting; people who are in the top 25% income bracket? “Anyone looking at the past 15 years would
be hard pressed to day entrepreneurial capitalist being straggled by the estate
tax,” notes Gale, top economist at the Brookings Institute. Looking a bit deeper one would find the
elimination of the estate tax would discourage charitable giving. No one pays any
estate tax on what they give to charity, so may people giver more to charity to
avoid the tax. One policy paper is
quoted that researchers at Boston College found people with estates of less
than $625,000 leave 5%to charity.[18] Another stated in “1997, of 329 taxable
estates with gross assets above $20 million, 182 made charitable contributions,
and those that did contribute an average of over $41 million.”[19] The favorable deduction to the tax on charity
helps raise funds for the nonprofit sector. The repeal of the legislation would
raise incomes of the richest family and would decrease charitable contributions
(noting they would have no incentive to give.)
Policy experts suggest not
eliminating the tax, as Bush campaigned on in the fall of 2000, but rather
adjust the tax to become more equitable and reliable.[20] Reforms include rising exemptions (to
farmers and small business-so they don’t have to pay the tax), closing
loopholes (yet this would lead to less charitable deductions, but it would make
a less administrative burden for tax officials), reducing rates (but you would
need to broadened the base in order to maintain the same amount of revenues
received each fiscal year) and lastly index inflations to include issues of
yield on the tax.[21]
Yet with such proposals, the tax
system becomes more complicating breeding different rules for different levels
of income (causing administrative difficulties). The key is to make few
distinctions across economic activities and personal characteristics. Taxes should be imposed on a broad income
base at lower rates to the lower income earners and higher to the other end of
the system. This may eliminate the
progressively of the tax.
If the rates were lowered then
the base needs to be broadened. This
would create a “fairer, more politically palatable tax, at a much lower cost,”
stated Rep. Charles Rangel (Dem- New York).
The $40 billion a year saved from avoiding repeals (this includes
charitable donations/deductions) could go to planed government spending. Top rates should be lowered to below 50% on
large estates and add credits to include charitable donations.
The extraordinary high tax rate
(between 37 to 55%) causes high amounts of avoidance of the tax. Yet the avoidance often attributes to those
families who use sophisticated tax planning. This may eliminate their
propensity to save, but it does increase charitable donations. Closing loopholes will aid to the
administration of the tax but it must not interfere with the amount of
charitable deductions given.
David Joulfaian, and economist at
the Treasury Department have qualified these assumptions. “The reduction in the
estate tax would cause charity to decrease giving. Without the incentive of the tax, Joulfaian
found that the people with large estates would give 12 percent less to
charity. That alone adds ups to over a
billion dollars a year.”[22]
Do higher income earners have the
right to see where their money is being spent? Wouldn’t charitable deductions
do just that, allow for individuals to be accountable to the government while
watching their pennies. Doesn’t the Estates and giving tax with its loophole to
allow charitable deductions give incentives to help others? Another policy question is the efficiency of
government to aid the poor over nonprofit organizations.
Charitable contributions Deduction for Non-Itemizers
As noted above in who donates to
charities, within the U.S. 70.1% of American households reported to have giving
to charity and an annual $1,075 average annual household contribution were
reported for 1998.[23]
These numbers come from only those households who were able to deduct their
giving with itemized deductions, notable the higher incomes are most included
to itemize. This inflates mean incomes
contribution suggesting the quantity donated come from fewer households at
higher incomes. Federal law from 1982 to
1986 allowed all taxpayers deductions to charity regardless of itemizing or
not. This creates an incentive for more
people to donate funds to charity increasing the quantity supplied and
improving the static of man average household’s donations.
Current law states that only
individual taxpayers who itemize their deductions may claim deduction for
charitable contributions meet qualified charitable organizations.[24] This amount may not exceed 50%of the
taxpayers adjusted gross income. The
reason for change is that there is no tax incentive to increase charitable
contributions for people who do not itemize their tax returns. The current proposal will provide more
incentive for deductions for itemizers as well as non-itemizers. It will allow non-itemizers to deduct 50% of
their charitable contributions in excess of $500 for individuals and $1,000 for
joint married filers.
Known as the CARE Act of 2002,
the bill will allow 86 million taxpayers to deduct up to $400 for individual
filers for charitable deductions and $800 for joint files. Nonprofit
organizations are in favor of this legislation because it allows for a greater
dispersion of government incentives to donate to charity. This can only increase quantity supplied
adding to annual budgets of these organizations. Yet are these deductions
efficient, equitable, or administratively feasible? Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in
Economic Policy Government and Finance, has written a comprehensive report to
Congress on Charitable contribution deductions for non-itemizers that will be
used for argument in this paper. [25]
Efficiency is recognized in the
arguments above explained that charity is a public good and it is under
produced explained by economic theory.
Therefore mandating tax deductions will increase the supply. Yet questionably so, one asks whether
charitable deductions (giving public monies to private organizations to do
charitable deeds) is more effect than government policy its self. Yes it does eliminate free rider problems but
it also questions the role of government in welfare and poverty reduction. Also the use of charitable deductions
questions the really use of benefits of the charity. Where do the benefits go? Donors take advantage of the monies invested
receiving items for their favorite charity, allowing families-members to enter
private universities, benefiting from the church they attend. Also leakages of the funds do exist, not all
money not taxes go to the needy but also to administrate the nonprofit
organization. This in effect replicates
government spending on its own infrastructure.
Price elasticity also influences
efficiency arguments. Does each dollar
spent it stimulate another dollar in the private sector to charity or is the
private charitable tax exemption less efficient than the direct spending of the
government? Gravelle suggests:
“As a rule of thumb, without
considering other factors (such as the whether the contribution go to that
charitable purpose ant the effects of caps), a dollar of revenue cost will
result in more than a dollar of giving if the price elasticity is above one in
absolute values. “
There are various income and
substitution effects related to the price-elasticity of a goods demanded. If elasticity is greater than one, demand is
elastic, making the demand for an item very responsive to price changes. If
prices go up than there will be less quantity demanded. If an item’s elasticity is less than one, the
demand is inelastic- not very responsive to the price change per quantity
demanded. Higher income individuals
choose to donate to charity when they have temporary high increases in income,
creating high elasticity of 1.3 or higher or .5 when correcting for time
effects.[26] These rates justify the high donations given
with the estate tax. But studies for
non-itemizer contributions suggest elasticity to be below one in absolute
values. This study, while not justifying for transition effects, found effects
in elasiticities for 1985 to 1986 of 1 to 1.24 for itemizers, and .8 to .6 for
non-itemizers. These non-itemized
dedicators face higher elasticities, when income is higher. They will be more in favor of donating, but
will save their pennies when their money is less fluid at higher rates than the
itemized dedicators.
With itemized and non-itemized
deductions, policies can cap (make atop to how much you can deduct) or a floor
(the little you can deduct) changing the outcomes of the percent donated. Caps on donations increase nominal values,
but they also decline in value treated to income. “A capped deduction is less costly than an
uncapped deduction but also less efficient.
It is possible to increase the efficiency level by the use of a floor.”[27]
Floors benefit as with higher incomes and ceilings benefit with lower
incomes. Therefore a mixture of both
will create an optimal solution.
Equity issues for non-itemizers
are not a primary issue, but they do allow benefits for lower and
moderate-income classes to receive tax cuts for deductions. This will add to the benefits received to
charity organizations. This will also
make more equity to those who don’t item (who are primarily higher income
earners). This allows more people to
benefit form the tax deduction.
The administrative burden of
non-itemizers adds complexity and limits simplicity to tax forms. Time given to organize paper references to
provide proof of charity giving increases inefficiencies of the tax break. The lack of correct record keeping for small
sums like charitable contributions may induce tax evasion. Therefore safe reporting policies need to be
developed which is very administratively burdensome.
Policy options for non-itemizer
deduction may include eliminating (or increasing) caps while proving only
partial deductions (like allowed in during the 1981-5 tax policy period). Also floor based on income would be most
effective, but difficult to compute, therefore adds high administrative burden.
Lastly, Gravelle suggests, ”to use
revenue hat would have been directly at the tax cut to fund spending programs
aimed at the same objective, either through a direct government program or a
grant that might be administered by a private entity.” This suggestion directs at the main subject
of this paper, of weather or not the private deductions in taxes allowing for
more charitable giving actually helps the poor better then government programs
aimed at the poor.
Conclusions
This paper has tried to argue that the mix of
output of government provision or independent sector of poverty reduction is
the best forms for dealing with the underproduction of charity. We have looked at the economic theories for
welfare policy, analyzing public goods and it’s under provision, if let up to
the market. Tax policy provides incentives to give called deductions. Whether the deductions are for charitable
giving to the estate and gift tax or for non-itemize tax returns, both are
important. The optimal levels need to be
found.
Although the estate tax is one of the most
progressive taxes it also questions equity.
Weather the more wealth should decided policy, by directing their monies
to specific sectors or areas, or should they subject their tax dollars to the
welfare system that is manage by the government. Who runs their system more
efficiently;, the independent sector or the government? Who should dictate
policy, the voices of democracy or the higher income earners?
Non-itemizers are generally not
higher income people who may donate small sums of money to charity. These sums do add up and create large amounts
for non-profits to run on. The problem
comes in regulating the funds, which create large administrative burdens.
Therefore one needs to question if this is an efficient way to generate revenue
for charity. Money people are able to benefit
from the deduction stimulating vertical equity but it cuts into efficiency of
the tax. Yet does government provision
of welfare do just what the tax deduction would do, aid the poor, but more
efficiently?
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Randolph, William C., Dynamic
Income, Progressive Taxes and the Timing of Charitable Contributions,
Office of Tax Analysis Paper 69, U.S. Treasury Department, August 1994.
Schwartz, R.A., Corporate
Philanthropic Contributions, The Journal of Finance 479-497.
Salamon,
Lester M., The International Guide to Nonprofit Law. New York: John
Wiley and Sons. 1997
Sharpe
et.al. Economics of Social Issues
15th Edition. p. 148.
Slemrod, Joel (ed.), Tax
Policy in the Real World. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999
*Speakout.com produces weekly
policy papers published at policy.com the following articles were extracted
April 4, 2002:
- Bob Kolasky, “Issue of the Week: Give a Little Bit, September 2,1999
- Bob Kolasky, Issue of the Week: Who should help the Poor? November 28, 1996
- Elias Crim, Smart Talk: Brother, Can you spare a Tax-Free Donation? September 11, 1997
- Walters, John P., Opening the Floodgates, September 2,1999
Tehan,
Rita, Information Research Special Congressional Reference Division, Grants
and Foundations: Selected Print, Electronic, and Internet Sources on Government
and Private Funding, January 6,1999, CRS Report for Congress
*Walker,
Robert, Lessons in Leadership: Make Your Voice Part of the Debate on Public
Policy and Charitable giving, The Management Center (www.tmcenter.org) April 6, 2002.
*
Indicate these are not academic works but policy papers or opinion columns that
I have used shaped my arguments in this paper
[1]
Walters, John P., Opening
the Floodgates, September 2,1999
[2]
Independent Sector, The New
Nonprofit Almanac In Brief: Facts and Figures from the Forthcoming New
Profit Almanac and Desk Reference
and Giving and Volunteering in the United States,1999, books from the
Independent Sector 2001.
[3]
Bob Kolasky, “Issue of the
Week: Give a Little Bit, September 2,1999
[4]
Walters, John P., Opening
the Floodgates, September 2,1999
[5]
Independent Sector, The New
Nonprofit Almanac In Brief: Facts and Figures from the Forthcoming books from
the Independent Sector 2001
[6]
Ibid, pg 5
[7]
ibid,pg 11
[8] ibid pg13
[9]
Brown, Eleanor, Department
of Economics, Pomona College, and Al Slivinski, Department of Economics,
University of Western Ontario, Wallis Institute of Political Economy,
University of Rochester, Household Decisions Regarding Charitable Gifts
DRAFT: Preliminary results, June 2000, Claremont Colleges working papers in
economics.
[10]
ibid
[11]
Schwartz, R.A., Corporate
Philanthropic Contributions, The Journal of Finance 480
[12]
Sharpe et.al. Economics of Social Issues 15th Edition. p.
148.
[13]
Audreoni, James, Impure
Altruism and Dominations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, The
Economic Journal, 100 (June1990), pg 464.
[14]
Audreoni, James, Impure
Altruism and Dominations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, The
Economic Journal, 100 (June1990), 473.
[15]
Gravelle, Jane G. and Steven
Maguire, RL 30600: Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues CRS Report for
Congress, December 12, 2000.
[16]
USA Today Editorial, “Debate: Tax
Cuts,” posted 8/5/00
[17]
Gale, William and Joel Slemrod, Resurrecting
the Estate Tax, Policy Brief #62-June 200 Brookings Institute
[18]
Havens, John, J. and Paul G.
Schervish, “Millionaires and the Millennium: New Estimates of the Forthcoming
Wealth Transfer and the Prospects for a Golden Age of Philanthropy,” Boston
College Social Welfare Research Institute, Report Released Oct. 19,1999.
[19]
Gale, William and Joel Slemrod, Resurrecting
the Estate Tax, Policy Brief #62-June 200 Brookings Institute, pg 5 of 7
[20]
USA Today Editorial, “Debate: Tax
Cuts,” posted 8/5/00
[21]
Gale, William G. and Joel Slemrod,
Rethinking the Estate and Gift Tax, Conference Report #5-March 2001
Brookings Institute
[22]
Cohn, Edward, The Estate Tax and
Charity, policy paper for the Common wealth Nonprofits, Philanthropy and Civil Society (www.epn.org) April 6, 2002
[23]
Independent Sector, The New
Nonprofit Almanac In Brief: Facts and Figures from the Forthcoming books from
the Independent Sector 2001
[24]
Department of the Treasury, General
Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2001 Revenue Proposals,
February 2000
[25]
Gravelle, Jane G. CRS Report for
Congress: Economic Analysis of the Charitable Contribution Deduction for
Non-Itemizers, August 31,2001.
[26]
Gravelle, Jane G. CRS Report for
Congress: Economic Analysis of the Charitable Contribution Deduction for
Non-Itemizers, pg 5.
[27]
Gravelle, Jane G. CRS Report for
Congress: Economic Analysis of the Charitable Contribution Deduction for
Non-Itemizers, pg 12.
